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The current peace process between the Colombian government
of President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (“FARC-EP”) has been in
progress for the past five years and recently led to a historic Final
Agreement between the two parties signed in Havana, Cuba,
August 24, 2016. One of the main points on the agenda throughout
the negotiations has been finding a solution to the country’s
problem with illicit drugs. Both the government and the FARC
themselves have recognized the FARC’s involvement in the illicit
drug industry. This has led to the negotiations on how the FARC
can now work with the government to put an end to the industry
that has plagued the country for so long. Within these negotiations,
there have been indications that the government may be preparing
to pardon the FARC’s narcotrafficking crimes by connecting them
to the group’s political crimes. This article focuses on the FARC’s
involvement in narcotrafficking. As an insurgent group committing
the political crime of rebellion, the FARC’s crime of rebellion
qualifies for certain special treatment (i.e., amnesty and pardon)
because of the political motive of the crime. Whether that special
treatment can be extended to the crime of narcotraffic is a separate
and important question. This article looks at whether the FARC’s
narcotrafficking can legally be considered a crime connected to
their political crime of rebellion. According to the amnesty law
issued by the Colombian congress as a result of the peace
agreement, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace will address this
discussion of whether the crimes can be connected. In this article,
we support this decision by the Congress. Considering that a
deeper analysis of the full extent of the FARC’s participation in
narcotrafficking is required to answer this question, there must be
room for investigation and application of legal criteria to arrive at
the right answer—the one that is closest to the truth.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
For more than five decades, Colombia has suffered a domestic
armed conflict. Different illegal armed groups have participated in
this conflict against the government. One of these armed groups is
the oldest guerrilla group in Latin America: Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia—the People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo) known
globally as the FARC.1 Around 2010, the current President of
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, initiated conversations with this
armed guerrilla group with the intention of reaching a peace
agreement.2 In August 2012, the Colombian government officially
announced that they had reached an agreement with the FARC to
begin formal negotiations.3 On the agenda for negotiation were six
items, one of those–Point Four–focuses on the goal of ending the
illicit drug trade in Colombia, and in so doing, refers to the issue of
the FARC’s involvement in the illicit drug trade.4 That issue–the
FARCs involvement in drug trafficking and its legal consideration
as a connected crime to the political crime of rebellion–is the
subject of this article.
In November 2016, both parties arrived at a final agreement on
all six points of the agenda constituting “The Final Agreement for
the Termination of Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and
Lasting Peace” (Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto
y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera).5 Point Four of
the agreement recognized the involvement of the FARC in the
illegal drug trade. However, it was careful to refer to it in a manner
that implied all the involvement was strictly tied to the rebellion.
“Rebellion” is a political crime that consists of using arms to
overthrow the national government, or to suppress or modify the
constitutional or legal regime in force.6 As established in the
Secretariado Nacional de las FARC-EP, Quienés Somos y Por Qué
Luchamos, FARC-EP, http://www.farc-ep.co/nosotros.html
2
JUNE S. BEITEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42982, PEACE TALKS IN
COLOMBIA 15-16 (2015).
3
Id.
4
See id. at 22.
5
Id. at 15-16.
6
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WARFARE AND STATE FORMATION 26 (Jari
Eloranta et al. eds., 2016).
1
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Colombian Constitution as well as the Final Peace Agreement, in
contexts such as peace processes, perpetrators of rebellion and
other such political crimes can receive the benefits of amnesty,
pardon, and exemption from extradition. In addition, in most cases,
common crimes perpetrated by the insurgent groups that are
deemed connected to the group’s political crimes receive the same
benefits.
Neither the Final Agreement nor the amnesty law issued under
the Agreement expressly state that the drug trafficking committed
by the FARC constitutes a connected crime.7 However, the
language used when referring to the relationship of this armed
group with drug trafficking, as well as the inclusive criteria laid out
for the determination of the connectedness of the conduct, give a
strong indication that the FARC’s involvement in drug trafficking
will be considered a connected crime. For example, this would be
achieved by considering drug trafficking a crime related to the
political crime of rebellion by stating that the crime was carried out
solely for the purpose of financing the rebellion, and that the
proceeds were used exclusively to this end.
In this paper, by applying universally accepted tests, and
Colombian case law, we arrive at specific results that the FARC’s
involvement in drug trafficking cannot be excused as a connected
crime to the rebellion. This article does not aim to present a
definitive answer regarding the extent of the FARC´s involvement
in the drug trafficking industry—that is a question various
governments and organizations have been trying to answer for over
thirty years. Instead, it will lay out facts that introduce doubt as to
whether the FARC’s involvement in narcotrafficking went beyond
being merely a tool to commit rebellion.
Given the relationship of narcotraffic with the Colombian
armed conflict, the need for truth and reconciliation, and for a
“stable and permanent” peace, we argue that it is essential to have
a serious investigation, analysis, and discussion before the Special
Jurisdiction for Peace on the issue of narcotraffic and the true
extent of the FARC’s involvement.
This article is organized into three parts. Part I contextualizes
the FARC´s history and its different phases as an armed group in
7

See generally id.
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Colombia, as well as its involvement with the illicit drug business
throughout the decades. Part II presents the concept of political and
connected crime through the different theories developed
worldwide culminating in the historic and legal development of
political and connected crime in Colombia. Part III, applies those
theories to the issue at hand—whether the FARC’s involvement in
narcotrafficking could be a connected crime. Finally, we conclude
that regardless as to which test is applied, for phases four to six,
the FARC´s narcotrafficking activities could not qualify as
connected crimes to the political crime of rebellion.

II.

THE FARC—THE OLDEST GUERRILLA GROUP IN
THE AMERICAS, AND ITS INVOLVEMENT WITH
THE MOST PROFITABLE ILLEGAL BUSINESS ON
THE CONTINENT.

A.

History of the FARC
The origin of the armed conflict in Colombia is not necessarily
connected with the guerrilla movement8 as we know it today. The
history of violence goes back to the early 1900s and the
sociopolitical realities of Colombia as a new independent
republic.9 Both the causes of the violence and the actors carrying it
out have evolved during the course of the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries; the guerrilla actors born in the 1960s have sustained
the fight over the longest period in history, and the FARC10 has
been one of the most prominent contributors to the violence the
country has suffered.
Though it began before the Cuban Revolution, the guerrilla
movement in Colombia was heavily influenced by that event and

See generally Fernán E. González, The Colombian Conflict in Historical
Perspective, 14 ACCORD 10, 10-15 (2004) (discussing the historical context of
the current Colombian armed conflict).
9
See generally John H. Coatsworth, Roots of Violence in Colombia: Armed
Actors and Beyond, REVISTA HARV. REV. OF LATIN AM., Spring 2003, at 3, 3-7.
10
Id.
8
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the Communist Party.11 The guerrilla movement was organized as
a response to the accelerated economic development model
implemented in Colombia. The model was to maximize capital by
the redistribution of agricultural lands to a select few, and the
industrialization of that land.12 “This economic model led to the
creation of a ‘peasant guerrilla’ discontent with the mal-use,
misuse, and under-use of human resources with the
underutilization of the country’s best lands.”13
This guerrilla movement started in Colombia’s southern
regions, in the Department of Tolima where the peasants colonized
themselves.14 In September 1964, the different armed groups
created a coalition called the Guerrilla South Block.15 This
coalition was transformed into Las Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia or the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia–the FARC–a year and a half later.16 The FARC
became the peasants’ refuge from the repression of La Violencia;17
and their collective way of self-defense.18 From the beginning, the
FARC and the Colombian Communist Party (Partido Comunista
Colombiano or “PCC”) were independent and separate
organizations, despite both maintaining a relationship based on the
Marxism-Leninism ideology.
Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, La Insurgencia Armada: Raices y
Perspectiva, in AL FILO DEL CAOS: CRISIS POLÍTICA EN LA COLOMBIA DE LOS
AÑOS 80 411, 411-43 (Francisco Leal Buitrago & Leon Zamosc eds., 1991).
12
EDUARDO L. MONTERO & DALE W. ADAMS, ALGUNAS CONSIDERACIONES
SOBRE REFORMA AGRARIA EN REGIONES DE MINIFUNDIO: UN EJEMPLO
COLOMBIANO, CON BIBLIOGRAFIA REFERENTE A LA SITUATION COLOMBIANA 69
(1965).
13
JAMES J. BRITTAIN & JAMES PETRAS, AN OVERVIEW OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA-PEOPLE’S ARMY (FARC-EP):
A HISTORY OF RADICALISM IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, IN REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL
CHANGE IN COLOMBIA: THE ORIGIN AND DIRECTION THE FARC-EP 7 (2009).
14
GONZALO SANCHEZ & RICARDO PENARANDA, PASADO Y PRESENTE DE LA
VIOLENCIA EN COLOMBIA 362 (1987).
15
Roman Ortiz, Guerrilla Y Narcotrafico en Colombia, 22 REV. SEG. PÚB.
1,
9
(2000),
available
at
http://www.ugr.es/~ceas/America%20Latina/Guerrilla%20y%20narcotrafico%2
0en%20Colombia.pdf.
16
Id.
17
La Violencia is a decade between 1948 to 1958 of political and economic
violence in Colombia. See BRITTAIN & PETRAS, supra note 13, at 6.
18
Id. at 8.
11
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Marxism-Leninism is a dogma based on the theory and tactics
of the proletarian revolution.19 “This dogma rises out of the
struggles of the working and oppressed people and promotes their
revolution against capitalism and imperialism.”20 The FARC
adopted this dogma as a peasant movement campaigning for land
reform, fighting for better distribution of the wealth in the
country,21 and promoting a change of the economic model to
communism.22
The FARC, the oldest revolutionary movement in Colombia,23
has fought against the State for more than five decades putting the
group through different historical, sociological, and political
challenges under which it has had to adapt and transform in order
to survive and sustain its campaign. It started as a “ragtag
movement committed to land reform, the FARC has developed
into a well-founded, capable fighting force, known more for its
brutal tactics than its Marxists-Leninist influenced political
program.”24 Historians describe four phases of this group.25
However, it is necessary to add three more phases when
considering the transformation that has occurred over the past two
decades.
1. Phase One: Germination and Consolidation (1962-1973)
The FARC was created from a peasant group located in the
departments of Tolima, Huila, Valle, and Cauca in the southern
Victor Barraza, Foundations of Leninism, MARXIST INTERNET ARCHIVE
(May 2008), https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1924/
foundations-leninism/ch02.htm.
20
Id.
21
¿Qué es la Conferencia Nacional de las Guerrilleros [What is the
National Conference of Guerillas?]?, FARC-EP, http://www.farc-ep.co/octavaconferencia/que-es-la-conferencia-nacional-de-guerrilleros.html.
22
Central Report to the Expanded Plenary of the Central Major State of
the FARC-EP, FARC-EP (Oct. 6-20, 1983), http://www.farc-ep.co/pleno/plenoampliado-farc-ep-octubre-6-20-de-1983.html.
23
See generally Secretariado Nacional de las FARC-EP, supra note 1.
24
George J. Tenet, Statement by the Director of Central Intelligence Before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the Worldwide Threat 2001:
National Security in a Changing World, (Feb. 2001) https://www.cia.gov/newsinformation/speeches-testimony/2001/UNCLASWWT_02072001.html.
25
Gilberto Vieira, Colombia: Combinación De Todas Las Formas De
Lucha (Entrevista con Marta Harnecker), BIBLIOTECA POPULAR, Oct. 1988.
19
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region of Colombia.26 Influenced by the communist economic and
political model, its purpose was to promote an economic and
political change through refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the
Colombian government as representatives of the people.27
From its inception, the PCC funded FARC activities, aimed at
harassing the government in order to achieve their purpose.28 This
strategy shifted the violence in Colombia from violence with
bureaucratic underpinnings during the period of La Violencia,29 to
violence with strong ideological underpinnings.30
During this germination and consolidation phase, the FARC
armed activities were always executed within the limits of the
territories colonized by its members,31 and its military offensive
was of rural character. The military objective was the Colombian
Army,32 since the FARC was established as a collective selfdefense group by the peasant communities in the south of the
country who organized themselves for protection against the
extreme political and militaristic coercion by the government
during the period of La Violencia.33
2. Phase Two: Crisis and Division (1973-1980)
During the second national conference of guerrillas,34 the
FARC’s military plan was modified to incrementally increase the
See BRITTAIN & PETRAS, supra note 13, at 8.
See DANIEL PÉCAUT, GUERRA CONTRA LA SOCIEDAD 28 (1st ed. 2001).
28
BRITTAIN & PETRAS, supra note 13, at 8.
29
Bureaucratic violence presents itself as the bastion of status quo, and
operates within a type of organization that by the guidelines of conduct
demanded within, it behaves as an efficient mechanism to dissolve or neutralize
protests of all kinds; whether as citizens or individuals, whether within the
public or private sphere, whether for political, economic or other reasons. See
Edgar Straehle, En torno a la violencia burocrática: observaciones sobre uno de
los rostros de la violencia contemporánea, 4 ANUARI DEL CONFLICTE SOCIAL
427 (2015).
30
SANCHEZ & PENARANDA, supra note 14.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
See DANIEL PÉCAUT, GUERRA CONTRA LA SOCIEDAD 36-39 (1st ed.
2001), http://www.mamacoca.org/docs_de_base/La_Representacion_Social_del
_ narcotrafico/PecautDaniel_Guerra_Contra_la_Sociedad_EdEspasa_2001.pdf.
34
The “National Conference of Guerrillas” is a national meeting held by the
FARC, where the guerrilla group discusses the “current phenomena that affect
26
27
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number of members and fronts (frentes móviles)35 to distribute
their presence across the country. The goal was to expand the
military activities to other regions36 but this plan translated into a
weakening of the military offensive and a slow growth of its
presence in the territory.37
The PCC, Cuba, and the USSR funded the FARC during this
phase.38 The FARC, however, was only considered as a “strategic
reserve” of affiliates for the PCC in the probable scenario that a
dictatorship or extreme right government would take power in
Colombia39 as had happened in several Latin American countries.
3. Phase Three: Rebound and Boom (1980-1989)
Towards the end of 1970s, the expansion of the fronts to other
territories led to the rebound of the FARC, which grew from nine
to eighteen fronts by 1982.40 In May of 1982, the Seventh Guerrilla
conference took place. There, the FARC designed the ultimate
military objective of war against the State: surround and take over
the capital, Bogotá.41 In order to achieve this ultimate objective,
the FARC needed 16,000 members, enough food for the
population in the city, and to successfully provoke a civilian
uprising against the Government.42
the Colombian society.” In the conference, the group discuss the action plan to
be taken regarding that phenomena as well as the revolutionary process and the
military and political confrontation.
35
The fronts are units of the FARC that were implemented as a strategy to
go to other parts of the Colombian territory and to find supporters. Their purpose
was to expand the cause.
36
BRITTAIN & PETRAS, supra note 15, at 13.
37
JAMES D. HENDERSON, VICTIMA DE LA GLOBALIZACIÓN: LA HISTORIA DE
COMO EL NARCOTRÁFICO DESTRUYO LA PAZ EN COLOMBIA 185 (Siglo del
Hombre 1st ed. 2012).
38
Luis Fernando Trejos Rosero, Dos Momentos en la Actividad Política
Internacional de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército
del Pueblo (FARC-EP: Un Análisis desde la Categoría de Actor no Estatal 1
ESPACIO REGIONAL 99, 104-105 (2013).
39
Id.
40
Ricardo Vargas, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
and
the
Illicit
Drug
Trade,
TNI
(June
7,
1999),
https://www.tni.org/my/node/1464.
41
HENDERSON supra note 37, at 197.
42
Id.
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To carry out this ultimate military objective, the FARC
followed the plan designed during the ‘70s. The FARC grew
without any problems between 1982 and 1986 to the point of
increasing its membership by twenty-five percent.43 However, the
socio-political scenario was not only stirred up by the FARC-EP;
the M-19 group44 executed significant operations like the hostage
situation at the Embassy of The Dominican Republic, which
demonstrated the power of guerrilla groups in Colombia.
The significant growth in membership, followers of guerrilla
groups, and escalation of the confrontation with the Colombian
Army led the government to implement a policy of repression
across the territory, a policy that some compared to Brazil and
Argentina’s extreme-right government’s policies.45 By 1982, the
increase in violence motivated a stand from the government to
resolve the armed conflict with a peace agreement. The
government under President Belisario Betancur46 initiated
negotiations with all the guerrilla groups: ELN,47 EPL,48 the
FARC, and others. As a result, the Government issued a General
Amnesty Law to incentivize demobilization and, from there,
reached a cease-fire Agreement in 1984 with all the guerrilla
groups, including the FARC.49
The FARC created the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica or
“UP”), a political party, which became the political branch of the
43

Id.
The M-19 was an insurgent Colombian movement originated as a protest
against the alleged fraud of the presidential elections of the April 19, 1970.
45
LEONGÓMEZ, supra note 11, at 432 n.21.
46
Colombian President Belisario Betancur’s term in office lasted from
August 7, 1982 to August 7, 1986.
47
El Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), National Liberation Army in
English, is an insurgent guerrilla organization operated in Colombia. It is
defined by a Marxist-Leninist orientation and pro-revolution Cuban ideology.
48
El Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), or Popular Liberation Army in
English, was a Colombian guerrilla group that formed part of the internal armed
conflict with a Marxist-Leninist ideology. Though founded in February 1967,
the EPL did not initiate military action until 1968 in Antioquia (the Urabá and
Bajo Cauca regions). Later, it expanded into the departments of Córdoba and
Sucre and the region of Magdalena Medio until its demobilization in 1991.
49
Álvaro Francisco Patrón Marchena & Werlington Rojas Hernández,
Evolución y Situación Actual de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia (FARC), NUEVA GRANADA MIL. UNIV. (2012).
44
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guerrilla group50 as part of the peace negotiations with President
Betancur’s government. The FARC and the UP movements
allowed the guerrillas to leave behind its peasant group image
guided by the PCC (whom had abandoned the use of force as an
option by the time the peace negotiations took place).51 The UP’s
birth marked the FARC’s rupture from the PCC and it exposed the
FARC’s political independence, despite the fact that the FARC still
promulgated a socialist/communist agenda separating them from
the PCC which was a legitimate Colombian political party
participating in government and society.52
4. Phase Four: Deterioration and Delegitimisation (19891993)
The 1984 Cease Fire Agreement came to an end as result of
acts of harassment against the State executed by the FARC, as well
as the assassination of UP members by paramilitaries with the
alleged participation of the Colombian Army.53 This deterioration
of the peace talks led to the formation of the Simón Bolívar
Guerilla Coordinating Board (Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón
Bolivar or “CGSB”), which brought together all the guerrillas
groups54 to advance their campaign.
During this period, other armed actors appear in the history of
Colombia, intensifying and diversifying the violence.55 The
guerrilla movement was a relevant actor in intensifying the
violence, particularly the FARC. The guerrillas, however, were
unable to gain direct and massive support for the insurgent project
from the Colombian people.56

HENDERSON supra note 37, at 13.
ROSERO, supra note 38, at 110.
52
Id.at 104.
53
See generally id. at 103.
54
MARCHENA & HERNANDEZ, supra note 49, at 13.
55
Some of the other armed groups during the history of the Colombia
internal armed conflict, are: Quintin Lame, M-19, PRT, MIR Patria, EPL, ELN,
and AUC. See Int’l Crisis Grp. [ICG], Colombia: Prospects for Peace with the
ELN, at 7, ICG Latin America Report N°8 (Oct. 4, 2002).
56
SANCHEZ & PENARANDA, supra note 14, at 15.
50
51
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After the fall of the Soviet Union, the FARC stopped receiving
the same support, particularly the financial support;57 this forced
acquisition of funds from other sources. The FARC increased its
tactics of kidnapping and extortion of the Colombian population,58
as well as its involvement in the illegal drug trafficking industry, in
order to finance its operations.59
The FARC’s militarization of the insurgent project, the
Government’s policy of annihilation of the leftist movement, and
the proliferation of violence across the board, changed the
perception of the guerrillas in the eyes of the Colombian people
delegitimizing the insurgent project.60
5. Phase Five: Reorganization and Redirection (1993-1998)
By 1993, the FARC had reorganized both its political and
military strategies. It had forty-eight fronts around the country,61
increasing in control of great number of small towns, urbanized the
conflict by positioning a great number of members to the cities—
especially Bogotá, and implemented large-scale military
operations.62
Due to the loss of international supporters, in order to finance
its operations, the group used the relocation of the coca production
to the south of the country–FARC territory–to its advantage. The
guerrilla implemented a tax on coca buyers.63 Even after the drug
cartels from Medellín and Cali were dismantled in the ‘90s, the
coca production and the cocaine business kept on growing and the
FARC continued controlling those territories.64 The FARC’s
continued growth as an organization during this period points to
the conclusion that it became more involved in the illegal drug
operations with many theorizing the drug trade became the group’s
main source of economic resources.
57
See Luis Monroy Gonzalez, Consecuencias Regionales del Conflicto en
Colombia, WASHINGTON COLEGIO INTERAMERICANO DE DEFENSE 34, 34
(2010).
58
SANCHEZ & PENARANDA, supra note 14.
59
González, supra note 8.
60
PÉCAUT, supra note 33, at 172.
61
ROSERO, supra note 38, at 106.
62
See ROSERO, supra note 38, at 102.
63
MARCHENA & HERNANDEZ, supra note 49, at 14.
64
Id.

14

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:2

During this period the Colombian government lost control of
great parts of the territory causing criminal activity and the
production of illicit drugs to increase substantially.65 The drug
business spread its ink at all levels of Colombian society all the
way up to the highest office. The President elected in 1994,
Ernesto Samper-Pizano, was exposed to scandal immediately after
taking office.66 It was uncovered that Samper received drug money
to finance his electoral campaign.67
The “drugalization”68 of the Colombian society–the levels of
illegality and the lack of legitimacy of the Colombian
Government–created the best socio-political circumstances both
nationally and internationally, during the FARC’s existence, to
achieve their ultimate military objective. The FARC had become
economically and militarily autonomous and self-sustaining as a
result of its role in this crisis.69
6. Phase Six: Military and Economic Power (1998-2002)
Towards the end of the ‘90s, the inefficiency of Samper’s
Government due to the scandal for receiving drug money to
finance his campaign, allowed the FARC to reach the peak of its
military capacity to achieve the objective to overthrow the
Colombian government.70 In 1998, the state of violence in
Colombia was so high that President Pastrana was elected under
the agenda of negotiating a peace agreement.71 The peace talks
were achieved in exchange for several benefits: the warrants for
arrest on numerous FARC leaders were suspended, and a piece of
the Colombian territory was demilitarized for the FARC to
control.72 The peace conversations took place in El Caguán,73 or
HENDERSON, supra note 37, at 173.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Drugalization is a term created to refer to the phenomenon of the drugs
and drug-business affecting every aspect and sector of the Colombian society.
69
González, supra note 8, at 34.
70
HENDERSON, supra note 37, at 172.
71
Id. at 211.
72
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departments of Meta and Caquetá. Germán Hislén Giraldo Castaño, Apuntes
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zona de despeje, over the course of three years. The FARC,
however, intensified its military activities against the State and the
civilians during these talks, and El Caguán became the center of
operations for their trafficking businesses:74 drugs and arms.
Again, the FARC increased its extortion and kidnapping tactics
against the civilians in the country; it also escalated its attacks
against the Colombian Army and police forces, especially in the
municipalities strategically located in the drug-trafficking areas.75
As the guerrilla groups continued their campaign and gained more
control over the remote areas of the country and the drugtrafficking business increased in Colombia,76 the FARC’s
economic and military power increased. As consequence, the peace
conversations failed despite the Government’s efforts to achieve a
political solution to the armed conflict in the country.77
7. Phase Seven: Crackdown on the FARC (2002-2012)
By the end of Pastrana’s Government in 2002, Colombia was
the primary base of the global cocaine industry.78 Guerrilla groups
controlled most of the municipalities where the coca grew79 and
the FARC’s involvement in the business also increased.80
Additionally, the number of murders and kidnappings were higher
than ever. Colombia was considered the kidnapping capital of the
world due to the FARC’s campaign.81
As a result, the Colombian people started to unite and protest
against the FARC,82 and the European Union and the United States
Acerca del Canje de Prisioneros en la Historia de Colombia, 15 Grafia 106, 122
(2015).
74
MARCHENA & HERNANDEZ, supra note 49, at 15.
75
Id.
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Due to the U.S.’s plan to eradicate coca fields in Bolivia and Peru. See
generally Jeremy Bigwood & Phillip Coffin, Coca Eradication, Inst. for Policy
Studies (Oct. 6, 2005), https://ips-dc.org/coca_eradication/.
77
González, supra note 8, at 35.
78
Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, Colombia’s Civil Conflict, COUNCIL
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
(Jan.
11,
2017),
ON
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-civil-conflict.
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Id.
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GARRY LEECH, REBELS: FARC: THE LONGEST INSRUGENCY 83 (2011).
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HENDERSON, supra note 37, at 228.
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Cacerolazo Contra Las FARC, EL TIEMPO (Jan. 30, 2002, 5:00 AM),
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1338501.
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listed the FARC as a terrorist organization for their known links to
narcotrafficking, kidnapping, and violations of International
Humanitarian Law.83
President Uribe, who promised to debilitate the guerrilla
groups, especially the FARC, was elected in 2002, and a military
campaign was put in place against all the groups involved in the
armed conflict.84 The FARC was cracked down on during Uribe’s
government; its membership was reduced to half, the Colombian
army took control over a great number of remote municipalities
considered guerrilla’s territories, and the FARC leaders were
neutralized by detention or elimination in the battlefield.85
It has been recognized that the current peace process,
negotiated with President Santos, is only a consequence of the
crackdown of the FARC during the previous government. Thus,
Uribe’s policy to debilitate the FARC’s military indicates that the
group had the opportunity to achieve the objective designed in the
1970s–overthrow the government–during the 1990s’ state of chaos
and insecurity, but it was not carried out, rather the objective
seems to have been abandoned.
B.

FARC and Narcotraffic

1. The origins of the relationship of the FARC with
narcotraffic
Around the 1970s, Colombian cartels initiated the promotion of
coca crops in Colombia when acquiring the coca base from other
countries turned impossible.86 At its outset, the FARC purposefully
refrained from any involvement with drugs or drug trafficking87
ROSERO, supra note 38, at 110-12.
Id.
85
Cuatro claves del Estado que pusieron a las Farc en su peor momento,
TIEMPO
(Nov.
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2011,
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AM),
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http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-10713652; Los golpes más
contundentes dados en los últimos años a las Farc, EL ESPECTADOR (Nov. 4,
2011, 10:50 PM), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/los-golpesmas-contundentes-dados-los-ultimos-anos-farc-articulo-309633.
86
War and Drugs in Colombia, 11 CRISIS GROUP LATIN AMERICA REPORT
1, 4 (Jan. 27, 2005).
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Id. at 8. For instance when in 1978, narcotraffickers distributed seeds
among peasants in Caquetá, the FARC banned its use.
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believing that any involvement with drugs would undermine their
insurgent purpose.88 This opposition, however, did not last. Due to
the structural change caused by the military plan and objective
design created in the ‘70s and implemented in the ‘80s,89 the story
of the relationship between the organization and narcotraffic
began.
In 1982, in its seventh conference, the FARC announced its
intention to move from a defensive approach to an offensive one.90
To this end, the organization aimed at shifting into a
“Revolutionary Army.”91 This required changes not only in
strategy and structure, as mentioned above, but also in the
financing sources. These developing circumstances, as well as the
interest of wining the support of the population (which was mainly
comprised of farmers who derived their wage from the product of
illicit crops), facilitated the conditions to open the door to drugs.
Taxing the coca buyers was a starting point but never an
ending point. A ten to fifteen percent per kilogram tax was
established as the gramaje—that is the amount charged by the
FARC to the coca buyers.92 In the ‘90s taxation was extended to
other stages and participants in the drug business.93 Growers and
harvesters had to pay the FARC as well. By the ‘90s, the use of
illegal routes by narcotraffickers to transport both essential
chemicals for the processing of coca and the final product were
also on the FARC’s list of things taxed.94
Thomas R. Cook, The Financial Arm Of The FARC: A Threat Finance
Perspective, 4 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 19, 22 (Spring 2011). Others affirm that
getting involved with the drug business ignored FARC´s ideology that went
against the “exploitation by free-market traffickers.”
89
See id. (explaining that for those who sustained that as the FARC arrived
to a new territory, it propelled Lockheed to win over the population).
90
Id. at 21.
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Séptima Conferencia De las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP (May 4-14, 1982), http://www.farcep.co/septima-conferencia/septima-conferencia-de-las-fuerzas-armadasrevolucionarias-de-colombia-ejercito-del-pueblo.html.
92
War and Drugs in Colombia, supra note 86, at 8.
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Juan Guillermo Ferro & Graciela Uribe Ramón, El orden de la guerra:
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SOCIALES 173, 174 (2002).
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War and Drugs in Colombia, supra note 86, at 8.
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This means that the FARC´s link with narcotraffic survived
both the tension between the guerilla group and the Medellín
Cartel,95 and the emergence of the paramilitary groups78—who
took over the FARC´s former position of protecting the cartel´s
illicit crops. Through all this, the FARC managed to maintain and
gain control of over thirty-seven percent of the small towns in
Colombia, and of a great majority of the coca municipalities.96
2. Beyond the gramaje
By 1998, the FARC had monopolized the market in certain
areas of Colombia such as Caquetá, ordering the farmers to sell at
a specific price and only to the local FARC fronts. 97 The scope of
the FARC´s participation in narcotraffic, however, is still
uncertain. There are different positions on the matter; some, going
as far as to assimilate this group with the narcotraffic
organizations, based on what they consider an intrinsic and
indivisible relationship between them. Although, it is not clear that
the FARC’s involvement in narcotrafficking shifted them from
their original political motivations, what is clear is that there is
enough evidence to infer that FARC´s participation in narcotraffic
goes beyond what they have admitted to—the gramaje.
The FARC has maintained that their only involvement in
narcotrafficking was the gramaje, and explicitly stated during the
peace negotiations that they did not participate in any of the stages
of drug cultivation or distribution. In 2011, Alfonso Cano (FARC
commander), declared: “according to the documents and decisions
that rule us, no Farian front is allowed to cultivate, process,
commercialize, sell or consume hallucinogens or psychotropic
substances. Whatever else is said, is just propaganda.”98 In the
The tension between the FARC and the cartels who ran the illegal drug
trade resulted in the alliance of the cartels and the paramilitary groups. This new
alliance ousted the FARC from control of the farmers who produced the illicit
crops. That control was given to the paramilitary groups. See also Susan
Virginia Norman, Narcotization as Security Dilemma: The FARC and Drug
Trade in Colombia, 41 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 638 (2018).
96
ROSERO, supra note 38, at 10.
97
War and Drugs in Colombia, supra note 86, at 8.
98
Siempre Será Posible Construir Escenarios de Negociación con el
(June
11,
2011),
http://www.publico.es/
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PÚBLICO
internacional/siempre-sera- posible-construir-escenarios.html.
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context of peace negotiations, another FARC high commander,
Iván Márquez, declared that “we are not coca producers neither do
we have [processing] laboratories nor export [cocaine] or have
routes, those are the cartels.”99 On the contrary however, the
FARC’s known narcotraffic activities, the number of fronts
estimated to be involved in those activities, the Plan Colombia,100
and the offers made by the armed group to the government during
the 1999 peace process regarding the substitution of illicit crops,
all speak otherwise. Further still, the more recent accusations of
liaisons between the FARC and Mexican drug dealers, clash
against what the organization is prepared to accept.
According to a report of the Defense Ministry of Colombia, by
2000, there were twenty-three FARC fronts suspected of operating
in an active way within the country´s coca regions.101 In 2005, the
International Crisis Group (ICG) revealed that, “[t]he strongest
FARC presence is in the narrow coca belt that begins in southern
Nariño and stretches northeast through the Amazon basin and to
the grasslands of eastern Vichada, accounting for about 69,000 of
the 86,000 hectares of coca cultivated in 2003.” 102Also according
to the ICG, in the northern part of Colombia, though primarily
paramilitary zones, 110 FARC fronts are located in nine of the
north departments where coca and poppy cultivations occurred.103
There are reports that establish that by 2004, around sixty-five of
the 110 fronts104 operate in coca growing areas and trade.105 All
this data points to the idea that the FARC had an elaborate network
of coca cultivation fronts, which it controlled throughout the entire
country.
Will Grant, “Las FARC No Tienen Dinero,” Dice Iván Márquez, El
Número 2 del Grupo Guerrillero Colombiano, BBC MUNDO (Dec. 17, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/12/151216_farc_colombia_conflicto_
ivan_marquez.
100
See Bigwood & Coffin, supra note 76. Plan Colombia was an official
initiative entered into by the US and Colombian governments and signed into
law in 2000. Its purpose was to combat the drug cartels and the Colombian
insurgent groups.
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The United States and Colombia’s Plan Colombia partnership
consisted of both military and monetary aid and was launched to:
(1) reduce coca cultivation, (2) pursue the end of the Colombian
armed conflict, and (3) reform the country´s economy.106 Both
governments have acknowledged that the FARC’s earnings exceed
what a mere ten to fifteen percent tax would be capable of
creating.107 For instance, the CIA director in 2001 affirmed that the
FARC, “earns millions of dollars from taxation and other
involvement in the drug trade.”108 In the same vein, according to
some authors, the FARC earn around $500 and $600 million USD
annually from the illegal drug industry. 109 More cautious, the ICG
warned in a report that the main sources calculating the FARC´s
income are military, creating doubts as to their impartiality. Other
authors also advise that these numbers fluctuate depending on who
is making the estimate. In any case, the ICG report concluded that
even being conservative in the numbers, it can be fairly affirmed
that the FARC earn an average of $100 million USD per year in
drug related business; an amount that surpasses the organization’s
annual expenses five-fold.110 The reality that the majority of the
FARC´s income is derived111 from illicit drug activities further
supports that the organization’s involvement with the industry goes
far beyond just a ten to fifteen percent per kilogram tax.
Another indication that the FARC’s involvement in the illegal
drug business surpasses the gramaje is its capacity to control the
illicit crops industry in Colombia. During the 1999 peace talks, the
FARC presented the government with a proposal to collaborate in
the substitution of the illicit coca crops for legitimate crops in

Id. at 21.
See id. at 8.
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Tenet, supra note 24.
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Cartagena del Chairá,112 a region in which the guerrilla group
operated. During the same peace process the FARC negotiated
control of the demilitarized zone El Caguán, to be used as an area
where they would not face persecution and could therefore keep
the peace talks going. During the negotiations however, after the
FARC began to occupy El Caguán, the production of illicit crops
in the zone increased significantly. The peace talks of 1999 fell
through and by the end of the year Colombia was the leading drug
cultivator in the world and the production levels of the coca leaf
more than doubled from the previous year.113
Recently, a lot has been published concerning the FARC´s
involvement in trafficking cocaine internationally.114 Though there
are some115 that consider that there is not enough evidence to
establish the FARC´s participation, or even its capacity to
participate, in the latest stages of the drug business (i.e. refining
and trafficking), there are facts that point to the FARC’s
participation in those stages. The exchange of cocaine for arms
with other criminal groups is one example of the group’s
participation in the illegal drug business in the post-production
stages. FARC alliances with Russian criminal groups116 and
Mexican drug cartels117 for example, are both relationships
sustained by the FARC’s trading of cocaine for arms. Some may
argue that since the exchange is to acquire weapons it is simply the
continuance of the organization´s rebellion and therefore a support
112
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of the group’s political motive rather than an implication of a
criminalization of the organization.
It is important to note that these dealings at minimum reveal
that the FARC’s involvement in the drug trade industry goes
beyond their admission of the gramaje. The exchange of cocaine
for arms requires at least a relationship with the producer of the
final product and the national seller and international buyer. The
FARC are linked to those in stage one–the growers–in three ways:
(1) The admission of the gramaje in which the FARC
acknowledges its taxation of those carrying out the first stage of
cultivation, (2) its negotiations with the government in 1999 where
it used its power over the production of illicit crops as a
negotiating chip, and (3) the steady growth of drug crops in FARC
controlled territories. By exchanging drugs for arms, as the
Mexican and Russian cases show, the FARC is also linked to those
in the final stages. Together, these facts speak volumes of the
FARC’s relationship with the crop production and the latest stages
of the business.
The clear relationship links between the FARC and those
working the first stages and last stages of production raises the
question of whether the FARC has had connections throughout
every stage of illicit drug production. Though it is clear that the
FARC’s relationship goes beyond the accepted gramaje, there is
still the unanswered question of how far it actually goes.
Additionally, further evidence of an unanswered relationship
can be inferred by looking at the three following situations: (1)
Operación Gato Negro, (2) the accusation against the chief of
finances of the southern block of the FARC, alias Sonia, and (3)
the capture of Carlos Gamarra.118
First, Operación Gato Negro was a military operation
implemented by the Colombian Army.119 It took place in 2001 in
the eastern Colombian departments of Vichada and Guainia.120
This operation produced detailed information obtained directly
See generally Jeremy McDermott, Las Farc y el Narcotráfico: ¿Gemelos
CRIME
(May
26,
2014),
Siameses?,
INSIGHT
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from FARC documents regarding the production, processing and
transportation of cocaine by this organization.121 Relationships
between FARC members and international drug dealers were also
revealed as result of the operation. For instance, Fernandinho
Beira-Mar, a Brazilian drug baron, was captured while hiding in
the harborage of Tomás Medina, alias “Negro Acacio” and then
leader of the 16th Front of the FARC.122 Acacio was considered a
baron of narcotraffic; he was the first FARC member requested for
extradition purposes by the United States in relation to
narcotraffic.123 According to a 2003 Intelligence Report cited by
the International Crisis Group, the 16th Front, led by Acacio,
produced large amounts of cocaine (a capability estimated at
fifteen to twenty tons per month) “for sale to traffickers with routes
through Brazil and Suriname to Europe.”124 Several arrest warrants
and a red corner notice issued by the INTERPOL requested
Acacio´s capture for different charges, among them,
narcotrafficking. He was never captured and was ultimately killed
by the Colombian Army in 2007.125
Second, alias Sonia was another FARC leader legally
prosecuted for relations with narcotraffic.126 In 2004, she was
accused of shipping cocaine to Panama and the United States.127 In
2005, she was extradited to the latter for exporting cocaine there.
Two years later a District Court of Washington D.C. found her
guilty for the processing and exportation of cocaine to the U.S.128
121
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Third was the case of Carlos Gamarra, an international
trafficker who had business with the FARC.129 He was arrested in
April 2004 for “trying to provide material support to a designated
foreign terrorist organization, attempting to export defense
weapons without a license, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and
possession of machine guns.”130 According to the U.S. Department
of State, Gamarra was buying weapons for the FARC and had
received a down payment of $92.000 USD, where part of the
remainder was to be paid by the FARC with cocaine.131
Aside from the previous examples, thousands of media
documents speak of the FARC´s deeper involvement with drug
trafficking. However, some of the sources have not been confirmed
as concluded through academic studies and their reliability is not
100 percent supported.132 Thus, for purposes of certitude, we rely
solely on the result of both military operations and judicial cases to
affirm that the involvement of the FARC with the drug business
goes beyond the gramaje.
Again, the precise scope of the FARC’s involvement is yet to
be determined. Thus, we argue that the peace process opened a
great window of opportunity for this to be assessed; especially
when reconciliation, truth, and historical memory are at stake.
Unfortunately, it seems the peace negotiators thought otherwise.
When looking at the wording of Point Four of the Final Agreement
and the criteria established by the Amnesty Law to determine the
connectivity of a common crime, it appears the window of
opportunity to learn the truth may be at risk. Indeed, it leaves the
sensation that the negotiators agreed that the FARC’s involvement
in narcotraffic was always related to rebellion and solely for
News Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Man sentenced to 25 years in
prison for scheme to arm Colombian terror group with 4,000 grenades and 2,000
firearms
(Aug.
9,
2005)
(available
at
https://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/Illicit/ICE9aug05.pdf.).
130
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financing purposes. A connection like that to the political crime of
rebellion paves the way for the group’s amnesty. This decision
now relies on the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, where we hope
that the window of opportunity to conduct a thorough investigation
and a deeper analysis on this matter is seriously considered by the
prosecutors and the Justices.133
III.

THE POLITICAL CRIME AND THE CONNECTED
CRIME, FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND
THE COLOMBIAN VIEWPOINTS.

A.

Political Crime and Connected Crime
There is no universal or uniform definition for a political
crime, because it is a controversial matter and a matter of power.134
The inception of a political crime, both internationally and
nationally, was to address matters of security and stability of the
State in relation to conduct that negated and sought to obliterate
the State or its government. Thus, the political crime has an
extra-juridical character;135 it is not purely juridical, it is also
political.
This reality of political crime has led legislators and judges
across the globe to try to conceptualize it with a concrete
definition. A common ground can be identified among this
conceptualization, which supposes the identification of two general
components: a subjective and objective element.136 The subjective
element comprises the intent or motivation of the actor, which
must be political. The objective element considers the aim of the
See Rocío Quintero, Three major challenges the Special Jurisdiction for
(July 30, 2019),
Peace in Colombia faces, OPINIO JURIS
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conduct or the particular juridical interest at stake, which has to be
political. Thus, worldwide, political crimes are those that if
compared with common crimes would denote a political
component: a “political motive” or a “political context” or
“political consequences.”137
In light of the said political component, either as an objective
or subjective element, political crimes have been classified in order
to create a more scientific and juridical typology of the crime, and
also to be able to objectify their application to real scenarios. Even
today, the jurisprudence in the Western Hemisphere continues
following the French classification from the 1800s: the pure
political crime and the connected political crime.
1. Pure political crime
Pure political crime is conduct directed against the State,138 the
government, or the constitutional and legal system, which does not
involve elements of a common offense139 because there is no harm
to civilians, their property or interests.140
The pure political crime overlaps with the exercise of the right
of self-determination since it encompasses the right to resist
tyranny.141 This overlap is one of the reasons why the nature or
character of the pure political crime is extremely complex.
In order to achieve objectivity, the pure political crime has
been categorized into various types: rebellion, sedition, treason,
and espionage.142 These types of political crimes involve conduct
in of opposition to the State, system, or government (antisystemic)143 irrespective of having a violent or non-violent nature.
In specific contexts, such as peace processes, the perpetrators of
James J. Kinneally III, The Political Offense Exception: Is the United
States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty the Beginning of the
End?, 2 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 203, 209 (1987).
138
See Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty
Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1230 (1962).
139
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140
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pure political crimes could be granted allowances such as asylum,
exemption from extradition, and amnesty.
2. Connected political crime
A connected political crime is conduct that involves a complete
independent common crime committed jointly with a political
crime. The degree of connection between the political crime and
the connected crime is the element that determines the potential for
the application of the allowances mentioned above such as
amnesty.144
Despite the efforts to categorize, classify, and identify elements
of a connected political offense, determining when conduct is a
connected political crime is not a simple or straightforward
process.145 Attempts to make this classification throughout history
have led to three different approaches, which are typically used
worldwide: the political incidence test of Anglo-American law, the
political objective test of French law, and the political
predominance or proportionality test of Swiss law.
a. The Political Incidence: Test of Anglo-American Law.
Under this test, a connected political crime is a common crime that
is incidental to, and formed as part of, political disturbances
(British Approach).146 Further, political disturbances need to occur
with the valid intent to change the government or the system and
the connected crime must directly produce a political effect or
consequences (United States Approach).147
b. The Political Objective: Test of French Law. Under this test,
a connected political crime is a common crime directed against the
State, government, or system; it is not only a political crime by the
motivation of the actor or its context, but also by the juridical
interest that is affected with the conduct.148 The test takes into
consideration the motivation and the gravity of the means used in
the commission of the crime.149
Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, War Crimes and the Principles of NonExtradition of Political Offenders, 9 WAYNE L. REV. 269, 277-78 (1963).
145
Phillips, supra note 139.
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Capellà, supra note 136, at 12.
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c. The Political Predominance or Proportionality: Test of Swiss
Law. Under this test, a connected political crime is a common
crime that has a political motivation as a controlling one; there is a
direct connection between the common crime and the purpose
pursued by a party to modify the political organization of the State,
and that political motivation is the predominant factor.150
The three tests developed by State practice, which are followed
beyond the jurisdictions that gave birth to them, demonstrate the
difficulties of identifying a connected political crime when facing
the reality.
B.
Political Crimes and Their Connected Crimes under the
Colombian Legal Framework
The political crime in Colombia, as such, has been recognized
from both legislative and case law sources. On one hand, the basis
for its recognition has been the Constitution and the Criminal Code
has established its definition and the conduct that falls within this
category of crimes. On the other hand, case law has created the
basis for its continued development such as the idea of a connected
crime to the political crime, and the consequential legal response
that should be given to these related conducts.
1. Constitution of 1991
Colombia’s current Constitution, the Constitution of 1991,151
recognizes the existence of political crime in Colombia and its
special treatment. Numerous articles in the Constitution relate to
political crimes, for example the prohibition of extradition (article
35), the granting of amnesties and pardons (articles 150.17 and
201.2), and an exemption from the ban on holding some public
positions due to the commission of a crime (articles 179.17, 232.3
and 299).152
It is useful to consider the context in which the Constitution of
1991 was written, as political crime itself was a factor. The
Id. at 14.
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P].
152
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] arts. 35, 150.17, 179.17,
201.2,
232.3,
&
299,
available
at
http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/index.php/constitucion-politica.
150
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Constitution was the product of both the people´s movement,
known as the Séptima Papeleta, and the peace process with the M19. The peace process with the M-19 was the first peace process to
succeed between the government and a Colombian armed group.
The peace agreement, signed on March 9, 1990, included as one of
the points, a constitutional amendment (constituyente).153 The
Séptima Papeleta was an intellectual’s and union’s proposal
backed by the student’s movement, which sought to include an
additional ballot item in the election of 1990 requesting for the
establishment of a Constitutional Assembly (Asamblea Nacional
Constituyente) to write a new Constitution.154 When the decision to
promote an amendment of the Constitution was taken, the public
had the opportunity to vote for who would sit on the Constitutional
Assembly. Among those chosen were several former M-19
members and the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente was
summoned to draft the new Constitution in 1991.155 As a result, the
new Constitution was established with transitory provisions that
guarantee the societal integration of former members of the armed
group.
Envisioned within this context, transitory Article 30 gave,
within the peace process, the power to the National Government to
grant amnesties and pardons for political and connected crimes.156
The concept of connected crimes in Colombia was addressed
again in 2012 when the legislative and the executive branches
amended the Constitution with the Legislative Act 01 of 2012.157
This Act, known as the Legal Framework for Peace, added a new
DAVID RAMPF & DIANA CHAVARRO, THE 1991 COLOMBIAN NATIONAL
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY – TURNING EXCLUSION INTO INCLUSION, OR A VAIN
ENDEAVOUR? 6 (Inclusive Political Settlements Paper 1. Berlin: Berghof Found.
2014).
154
Séptima Papeleta, LATINNO, https://www.latinno.net/en/case/5180/ (last
visited Jan. 24, 2020).
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history
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Colombia,
CONSTITUTION
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http://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-colombia (last visited
Jan. 24, 2020).
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transitory provision—Article 67.158 It affirms that genocide and
crimes against humanity are not to be considered as connected
crimes.
The Legal Framework for Peace set the legal framework for the
peace talks between the FARC and the Colombian government.
Equipped with legislation allowing special treatment, the
government was able to negotiate with the guerilla group. These
negotiations culminated in the “Final Agreement to End the
Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Permanent Peace,”
signed on November 24, 2016 in Bogotá, Colombia.159
The Final Agreement provides three including criteria, and two
excluding criteria, in determining what is considered a connected
crime within the context of this peace process.160 It also adds
“grave war crimes” to the list of crimes that cannot be considered
connected.161
2. Colombian Criminal Code
The current Criminal Code of Colombia refers in Articles 467,
468, and 469 to three crimes committed against the legal and
constitutional regime: rebellion, sedition, and riot.162 Specifically,
Article 467 defines rebellion as the “conduct in which, by the use
of arms, individuals aim to overthrow the national government or
to suppress or modify the current constitutional or legal regime.”163
Neither the current Colombian Criminal Code, nor any
previous versions, define or even mention connected crimes as a
specific or recognized category. Nonetheless, historically, in
specific contexts such as transitional or partial transition from war
to peace in Colombia, some criteria for its determination has been
developed.

158

Id.
See generally Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a
Stable and Lasting Peace, Colom.-FARC-EP, art. 1-59, Nov. 24, 2016 (available
at
http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacionarmas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf).
160
See id. at art. 7.
161
Id.
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CÓDIGO PENAL [CÓD. PEN] art. 467-69 (Colom. 2000).
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CÓDIGO PENAL [CÓD. PEN] art. 467 (Colom. 2000).
159

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

31

3. Amnesty Law
As a result of the Final Agreement, Amnesty Law 1820 was
issued at the end of 2016.164 Article 2 of the law explains that its
objective is to regulate the amnesties and pardons that can be given
for political crimes and connected crimes.165 The Amnesty Law
also lays out specific criteria for what can and will be considered a
connected crime.166
Article 8, entitled “Recognition of the Political Crime,” affirms
that crimes that are considered political crimes are “those in which
the State and its current constitutional regime are the target of the
conduct when they are committed without the pursuit of any
personal profit.”167 It continues by saying that perpetrators of
political crimes can still be entitled to amnesties if they have
committed crimes connected to the political crime. It describes
these connected conducts as those “specifically related to the
development of the rebellion and committed in association with the
armed conflict, as well as conduct intended to facilitate, to support,
to finance, or to hide the development of the rebellion.” 168
Article 16, gives a non-exhaustive list of conduct that is
considered connected crimes to the political crimes: conduct
related to the illegal use or appropriation of means of
transportation, communications, weapons, and elections, among
others.169 Article 16 goes on to establish that if the Special
Jurisdiction for Peace Chamber, which grants amnesties and
pardons, considers conduct outside of what is listed, then its
consideration must be guided by the aforementioned criteria and
always bear in mind the exclusion of genocide, crimes against
humanity, “grave” war crimes, torture, forced displacement, and
rape.170

164
165
166
167
168
169
170

L. 1820, diciembre 30, 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
Id. at art. 2.
Id.
Id. at art. 8.
Id.
L. 1820, diciembre 30, 2016, art. 16, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
Id.
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4. Case Law
The greatest contribution to the Colombian conceptualization
of the connected crime comes from case law. Both the Colombian
Supreme Court of Justice and the Colombian Constitutional Court
have dealt with the question of what can be considered a political
connected crime. In the cases related to narcotraffic, each of the
Courts have had occasion to rule on narcotrafficking regarding
whether it could be viewed as a connected crime. These
narcotrafficking decisions still did not establish precedent as to
whether narcotrafficking is to always, or never, be considered a
connected crime. Both Courts have made important contributions
to the conceptualizations of the political crime and the connected
crime; the establishment of criteria to determine when a common
crime may or may not be considered a connected crime; the
exclusion of specific crimes from the category of connected
crimes; and specifically, on the analysis of the relation between
narcotraffic and a political crime.
5. Conceptualization
In 1945, the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice determined
that the distinctive element of a political crime was its political and
social motive, defining it as a “notorious interest of improvement
of the socio-economic and political conditions in the regime of the
institutions or in the exercise of the power given by the people to
the government.”171 According to the Court, this element
distinguished political crimes from common crimes.172 In the
absence of political and social motives, criminal conduct is
perpetrated with “individual aims and egoistic motives.”173
Identifying the socio-political motives of a crime does not
mean stifling the punitive power of the State. If conduct goes
against “public peace and the conditions of the constitutional
organization,”174 it has to be punished since it is in violation of the
law. The Court, however, recognized that different domestic
Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen.
septiembre 1, 1945, M.P: D. Sarasty Montenegro, Expediente 1945-412615,
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.](Colom.).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
171
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systems globally have given special treatment to the perpetrators of
these crimes, once legal order was re-established.175 The Court
mentions the special treatments afforded perpetrators of political
crimes, which include lesser penalties, exemptions to extradition,
amnesties, and pardons.176
Over the next several decades the Court continued to elaborate
on this definition. The Court maintained the distinctive element
that is the political motive element and framed it under two
categories, objective and subjective.177 The Court affirmed that for
a crime to be political, it has to be objectively political, meaning
the judicial interests protected with this crime relates to the State
and the Constitutional or legal regime.178 The Court went on to rule
that the crime must also have a subjective element that is the
political motive.179 The former, that is the juridical interests
protected, are the “State organization” and “the correct functioning
of the government.”180 The latter, that is the political motive, refers
to “seek the improvement in the direction of public interests . . . to
overcome the legitimate government, or change in whole or in part
the current constitutional or legal regime, or to disturb the specific
enjoyment of social activities.”181 Finally, the Supreme Court
affirmed that the identification of these political elements are what
allow for separate sanctions between political crimes and common
offenses that are committed within a subversive movement, “such
as fire, homicide and injuries caused outside combat, and,
generally, the acts of ferocity and barbarism.”182
In 1996,183 the Court referred again to the concept of political
crimes, this time presenting five characteristics of this conduct: (1)
175
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Sentencia, agosto 20, 1950, M.P: Carlos Eduardo Mejía Escobar, Expediente
1996-11439, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.).
176

34

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:2

it always involves an attack against the institutional and political
organization of the State; (2) it is committed to pursue the
maximization of social transcendence and political impact; (3) it is
committed by a real or apparent representation of a social or
political group; (4) it is inspired in social, political, and
philosophical principles that can be determined; and (5) it is
committed with real or apparent aims of socio-political
vindication.
Finally, in 2007,184 the Supreme Court synthesized the concept
of political and connected crimes from a theoretical perspective.
The approach to the connected political crime can be summarized
in three theories according to the characteristic element of the
crime, in terms of determining its political character: (1) objective
theory, where the characteristic element is that the juridical
interests protected are the State organization and the right
functioning of the government; (2) subjective theory, where the
characteristic element is the political motive; and (3) the eclectic
theory, where both the objective and subjective elements are
present in a political crime.185
The Constitutional Court has dealt in different decisions with
the concept of the political crime. In decision C-009 of 1995, the
Court defined the political crime, as a crime “inspired in an ideal
of justice,”186 that leads its authors and participants to commit acts
prescribed in the constitutional and legal order, “as a means to an
end.” Next, the Court considered that there should be different
legal treatment for those who committed a crime motivated by the
common well, as oppose to those who act with egoistic and
perverse motives.187 Finally, the Court delineated the concept of
conduct considered as political crimes under the Criminal Code.188

Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen.
Sentencia, diciembre 5, 2007, M.P: M. del Rosario González de Lemos,
Expediente 1996-25931, (Colom.).
185
Id.
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Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 17, 1995,
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No. D-630) (Colom.).
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6. Criteria applied by the Colombian Courts to determine a
connected crime.
In 1963, the Supreme Court developed what can be called the
“strict relationship test,” which gave criteria to determine the
degree of connection of a common crime to a political crime.189
According to this test, a common crime comes into the political
sphere “when one of the crimes cannot be explained without the
existence of the other,” and the essential motive is political.190 The
Court continues its explanation by stating that the degree of
connection is apparent when the harm to the juridical interest of
the political crime is linked with the political motive underlying
the commission of the common crime.191
Additionally, the Supreme Court in a decision regarding the
determination of granting pardon to members of the M-19 for
committing robbery, came up with another criterion that can be
called the “ideological (teleological) connectivity test.”192 Starting
from the subjective theory of the political crime, the Supreme
Court of Justice names "the ideological connection" between a
common crime and a political crime, as the determining factor for
the degree of connection.193 In that case, the Court concluded that
the ideological connection was the factor to determine that the
robbery was a "means to obtain economic resources for the
rebellion.”194 Thus, this is a teleological connection that the Court
referred as “ideological” due to the relation with rebel conduct.
In 1993, without establishing a test, the Constitutional Court
clarified that in determining the degree of connection of a common
crime to a political crime, the connection does not depend on the
crime itself but on the characteristics of the specific criminal

189
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conduct.195 For instance, the Court explained that when a homicide
is committed outside of combat, taking advantage of the
defenseless situation of the victim, there can be no connection
between the crime of homicide and the political crime.196
In 2002, the same Court created the “reasonable and
proportionality/equality” test, which explained that there is
criminal conduct that can be subsumed, reasonable and
proportionate, within the political crimes.197 The Court used
interchangeably the words proportionality and equality when
referring to the criteria, but explained the latter in terms of the
power of the legislator of including or excluding conduct to be
benefited by an amnesty or pardon.198 When doing so, the
legislator is prevented by the Court from doing it in an unjustified,
differentiated way. Regarding reasonability, the Court referred to
not making arbitrary decisions that failed to take into account the
nature of the conduct to be considered as a connected crime or as a
subsumed crime within a political crime.199 The Court failed,
however, to give factors that help limit each of the concepts of the
test.
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Justice established another
criterion derived from the classification of conduct as political
crime. Connected crimes are the ones that are closely intertwined
as a means to an end (teleological connectivity); as a means to
assure the product of other criminal conduct (paratractic
connectivity);200 or as a means to hide a previous crime
(“hipotática” (subordinate) connectivity).201 Thus, the central
Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], junio 9, 1993,
Sentencia C-214/93, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Expediente
R.E.-041) (Colom.).
196
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Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2002,
Sentencia C-695/02, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Expediente D3945) (Colom.).
198
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Sentencia, diciembre 5, 2007, M.P: M.del Rosario González, Expediente 2007415134, (Colom.).
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See also Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa.
Pen. Sentencia, noviembre 24, 2010, M.P: M. del Rosario González de Lemos,
Expediente 2010-34482, (Colom.).
195

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

37

factor in determining whether conduct is a connected crime is the
closely intertwined relationship between the two crimes and
whether the common crime was in fact a means to accomplish
something related to the political crime.
7. Excluding Specific Crimes
When excluding specific crimes from the category of a
connected crime, the Constitutional Court has noted the atrocious
character of certain crimes. The Court has affirmed that any
conduct committed in an atrocious way without respect for human
dignity must be excluded from the category of connected crimes.202
In this sense, the Court has expressly excluded certain conducts
as political offences. First, homicide only when it is committed
during combat and the aggressor took advantage of the victim’s
defenseless situation. 203 Second, kidnapping is considered by the
Court as atrocious due to the defenseless state in which the victim
is placed, the social instability that it causes, and the various
fundamental rights that are violated by this crime.204 Third,
terrorism, that as analyzed by the Court, the international
community has unanimous and repeatedly recognized as an
atrocious crime.205 Fourth, enforced disappearance of persons was
Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], junio 9, 1993,
Sentencia C-214/93, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Expediente
R.E.-041) (Colom.).
203
Id.
204
Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 23, 1994,
Sentencia C-069/94, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Expediente
No. D-388 Y D-401) (Colom.).
205
See Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 11,
2003, Sentencia C-127/93, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.]
(Expediente LAT-237) (Colom.); Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], mayo 28, 2008, Sentencia C-537/08, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional
[G.C.C.] (Expediente LAT-300) (Colom.).
The Constitutional Court in Decision C-037 of 2004, analyzed the
constitutionality of the law through which Colombia domestically approves the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
Article 14 of this Convention states that: “None of the offences set forth in
article 2 shall be regarded for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal
assistance as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political
offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for
extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be
202
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refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence
connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.”
The crimes referred in Article 2 are the following:
“Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian,
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”; “Unlawfully, by force or
threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seize or exercise control of,
(an) aircraft, or attempt to perform any such act”;Unlawful acts against the
safety of civil aviation, according to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23
September 1971, and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988;
A murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an
internationally protected person; A violent attack upon the official premises, the
private accommodation or the means of transport of an internationally protected
person likely to endanger his person or liberty; threat to commit any such attack;
An attempt to commit any such attack; and act constituting participation as an
accomplice in any such attack shall be made by each State Party a crime under
its internal law;
“Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to
continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in
order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international
intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of
persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition
for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages
("hostage-taking") … ”;
Any unlawful taking of nuclear material, according to the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 3 March 1980;
Any unlawful act against the safety of maritime navigation according to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988;
Any unlawful act against the safety of fixed platforms located on the
Continental Shelf, according to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf,
done at Rome on 10 March 1988;
“Unlawfully and intentionally deliver, place, discharge or detonate an
explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State
or government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure
facility
(a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
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excluded as a political crime (and thus, as a connected crime) when
the Court studied the institution towards the extradition
consequence.206 Fifth, though not expressly mentioning the crime
of extortion, in 1993, the Court made a wider list of atrocious
conduct in which extortion might be included given the context of
“narco-terrorism.”207 In the concurring opinion of decision C-095
of 2002, three Justices affirmed that, together with terrorism and
kidnapping, the crime of extortion is an atrocious crime that cannot
be included within the concept of political crimes and connected
crimes.208 Sixth, the conduct that is a result of “narco-terrorism”,
such as massacres, kidnapping, systematic murders and the use of
explosives against the civilian population, fall into the category of
crimes against humanity, and thus, will never be considered as
political crimes.209 Four years later, in decision C-456 of 1997, the
Court expressly excluded from the category of connected crimes,
crimes against humanity and all other crimes that are ferocious
and barbaric, as those international crimes.210
In conclusion, though over the years the Constitutional Court
has excluded specific crimes from falling under the category, the
Court has not named crimes that are to be considered, across the
board, as connected to political crimes. The Tribunal recognizes
that this is a legislative task of the Congress. Its exclusions,
(b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility
or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major
economic loss.”
The Constitutional Court found the law and the treaty in agreement with the
Constitution. Therefore, in Colombia, those crimes can not be considered neither
political crimes, nor connected crimes to the former.
206
Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 31, 2002,
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however, come from the recognition of the consequences of
affording certain benefits such as amnesty, pardon, and exemption
from extradition.
Without articulating an exhaustive list, the Supreme Court of
Justice has declared some specific conduct as connected crime. Its
decisions have been based on the “means to an end” ideology and
have been passed down on a case-by-case basis studying the
possible connection of common crimes to the political crimes of
rebellion and sedition. This has been done in the already
mentioned terms of finding robbery as a connected crime when
used “to obtain economic resources for the rebellion.”211 Another
specific conduct crime has been committed when determining that
the illegal acquisition of weapons is “a means to its subsequent
use” by the rebels or seditious. Thus, this conduct was found to be
a connected crime taking into account that the political crimes of
rebellion and sedition presuppose the use of weapons.212
Under the same rationale, the Supreme Court denied connected
crime status to a homicide committed outside of combat.213 The
Court found that the conduct lacked a political and altruistic
motive and ruled that “from a political point of view, in a
revolutionary sense, the conduct was useless,” and thus, did not
share the political connection required to the political crime.214 The
same reasoning lead the Court’s decision in 2003, when it found
lack of a political motive, together with an inconsistency between
the juridical interests affected by the alleged connected crime and
the political crime.215 In that decision, the Court affirmed that
Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen.
Sentencia, mayo 6, 1986, M.P: J.Carreño Luengas, Expediente 1986-406567,
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.).
212
Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen.
Sentencia, mayo 27, 1986, M.P: L.Martínez Zuñiga, Expediente 1986-406579,
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme
Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. Sentencia, junio 4, 1986, M.P: H. Baquero Borda,
Expediente 1986-406583, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.).
213
Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen.
Interlocutorio, agosto 20, 1996, M.P: C. Eduardo Mejía Escobar, Expediente
1996-409438, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.], (Colom.).
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Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen.
Interlocutorio, septiembre 10, 2003, M.P: Á. Orlando Pérez Pinzón, Expediente
2003-390055, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.).
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conspiracy to commit a crime cannot be considered as a connected
crime, since not only are its motives selfish and individualistic (as
opposed to the altruistic, generous, and collectively-oriented
motives common in political crimes), but the juridical interests
affected (public safety) do not correspond to the interests attacked
by the political crime (constitutional and legal regime).216
8. Narcotrafficking
Specifically regarding crimes related to narcotrafficking, both
Courts have had the opportunity to deal with decisions related to
political crimes, connected crimes and narcotrafficking.
The Constitutional Court has never expressly given or denied
criminal activities related to narcotrafficking the character of a
politically connected crime. Some approximations and indirect
references, however, have been made.
The clearest rejection of narcotrafficking as a connected crime
came in 1993. In decision C-171, during a scheduled constitutional
review of Decree 264 the Court affirmed that common criminality
cannot be confused with political criminality.217 In making this
point, the Court pointed to the violence produced from
narcotrafficking as an example. In its words:
The aim pursued by organized crime, particularly
through narco-terrorist violence, consists of putting
civil society in a defenseless position, when
threatening with irreparable harm, if they oppose
their ideals . . . . The atrocious acts committed by
narco-terrorism
. . . constitute crimes against
humanity, that could never be covered up with the
mantle of a political crime.218
216

Id.
Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 5, 1993,
Sentencia C-171/93, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.], (Colom.).
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See id. (Following the same path, in 2006, the Vice-Minister of Justice
and Interior of Colombia, affirmed that it should be taken into account that the
legislator has expressly denied the connection between sedition and genocide,
crimes against humanity or narco-traffick, in his official opinion requested by
the Constitutional Court. This was considered within the specific context of the
demobilization and the special jurisdiction for the paramilitary groups); see also
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Within the context of the FARC, the 2013 Decision C-579
assesses the constitutionality of the Legal Framework for Peace. In
doing so, the Constitutional Court’s decision refers to
narcotrafficking alongside conduct that it has already determined
will be prosecuted by the Special Jurisdiction—genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. This introduces doubt as to the
validity of the apparent silent decision taken by the negotiators to
grant narcotrafficking connected crime status.
Regarding the Supreme Court of Justice, the reference to the
narcotraffic activities in relation to political crime, has been
analyzed mainly in the context of requests for extradition. The
decisions have been related to one of two scenarios: first, when the
required person is not a member of an illegal armed group, and
second, when the person belongs to one of these groups, namely,
the FARC or the paramilitaries. The distinction between these two
groups is important because, the Colombian judicial system has
recognized the FARC’s ability to commit political crimes as
opposed to the paramilitary groups, which it expressly stated,
committed common, not political, crimes.219
In the second scenario, the Supreme Court has ruled on
whether FARC members would be extradited for narcotrafficking
or whether they could be exempted from extradition by calling the
narcotraffic a connected crime and extending it the same special
treatments as a political crime.220
When FARC members have been requested for extradition, the
Court has responded in two different ways. In 2004, the Court
affirmed that narcotraffic related conduct perpetrated by FARC
members can be considered connected with the political crime of
Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo, 18, 2006, C-370/06,
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.], (Colom.).
219
Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Pen. M.P: Y.
Ramírez Bastidas, Radicado 26949, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.], (Colom.). (stating
that during the peace process with the paramilitary groups, the Congress issued
Law 975 of 2005. Article 71 of Law 975, defined sedition as a political crime,
amending article 468 of the Criminal Code by indicating that members of
guerrilla or paramilitary groups also commit this crime if their “conduct
interferes in the normal functioning of the constitutional and legal order.” L.
975, art. 71, julio 25, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
220
Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Pen. M.P: Y.
Ramírez Bastidas, Radicado 26949, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.], (Colom.).
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rebellion when the narcotrafficking facilitated the execution of the
political crime.221 The Court went on to affirm, however, that
activities related to narcotrafficking may still warrant extradition
even when considered as a connected crime—that is, the connected
crime status does not automatically give the perpetrators an
exemption from extradition.222 In that case, the Court affirmed that
the FARC perpetrator of narcotrafficking would not be exempted
and as result, the request for extradition was granted and alias
Simón Trinidad was extradited to the United States.223 The Court
based its decision on the fact that Congress has not established that
narcotrafficking activities are per se connected crimes, and that
“the international community denies narcotrafficking this
characteristic,” explained in Article 3.10 of the UN Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances of 1988.224
The Supreme Court opined on the FARC’s narcotrafficking
activity again in 2015 this time concluding that it did not constitute
a connected crime.225 In the decision, which was also based on the
UN Convention of 1988, the Court maintained that connected
crime status, even if granted, cannot be an obstacle for extradition
purposes.226 In the 2015 case, the circumstances in which the
narcotrafficking activities occurred were: the coordination of the
“Tenth Front's narcotics trafficking activities (of the FARC),
including the purchase, manufacture and transportation of cocaine
and cocaine base.”227 This means that the Court considered that
even in this specific context (FARC narcotraffic related activities),
those criminal activities are prevented from being considered as a
connected crime for the purposes of the UN Convention of 1988,

Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen.
Concepto de Extradición, noviembre 27, 2004, M.P: S. Espinosa Pérez,
Expediente 2004-22450, (Colom.).
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Id.
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Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen.
Concepto de Extradición, Sept. 2015, M.P: Eugenio Fernández Carlier, CP 1172015 (Colom.).
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which includes not only extradition (article 6) but also
investigation and prosecution (article 7).
As per the paramilitary’s requests, the Court arrived at the
same conclusion of not preventing extradition for narcotraffic
related activities based on the absence of definition by the
Congress of a list of crimes that can be considered as connected to
the political crimes and the “denial of this character (narcotraffic as
a connected crime) by the international community”, as established
in the UN Convention of 1988.228
Worthy of noticing is decision No. 24187, in which the Court
in the context of extradition, affirmed, “there is no way in which
narcotrafficking can have a connection with sedition as a political
crime.” The Court based this last affirmation in the two arguments
already mentioned and used in previous decisions.229
In conclusion, we can affirm that the Supreme Court of Justice
considers that in principle, narcotrafficking activities are neither
political crimes nor connected crimes, when there is no rebellion or
sedition context. However, we can also affirm that the Court has
not been conclusive with respect to this classification given the
rebellion or sedition context. Noteworthy also, is that the Court did
not find a difference when analyzing and concluding the degree of
connection of narcotrafficking activities on the part of the FARC
(capable of political crime), with that of the paramilitaries
(incapable of political crime).230
Finally, it should be highlighted that the Supreme Court´s case
law seems to ignore the fact that the UN Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988
does not make a difference or exception relying on a given context
(for example, financing or supporting a rebellion) when it denies
the character of connected crime to narcotrafficking related
228
Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen.
Concepto de Extradición, diciembre 2007, M.P: S. Espinosa Pérez, 28505,
(Colom.).
229
Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen.
Concepto de Extradición, septiembre 26, 2007, M.P: J. Enrique Socha
Salamanca, 24187, (Colom.).
230
This might have changed after the Constitutional Court´s decision
declaring inconstitutional Article 71 of the Law of Justice and Peace. This
article proposes the possibility to consider that paramilitarism in Colombia
consisted in the crime of sedition.
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activities. The Convention only refers to the purposes in which this
prohibition applies, that is, not only extradition but also mandatory
investigation and prosecution. Thus, based on this Convention,
there is no reason to conclude that the international rule (of no
exception to the prohibition of categorizing crimes against
humanity, genocide and war crimes as connected crimes to
political crimes) is not applicable or extended to narcotrafficking.
IV.
DETERMINATION OF FARC´S
NARCOTTRAFICKING ACTIVITIES AS A
CONNECTED CRIME TO REBELLION
In order to determine if there is a connection between the
FARC’s political crimes and their involvement with
narcotrafficking, the universal tests as well as Colombia’s
principles should be applied to the facts. Before this application
however, it is important to understand where Colombia currently
stands politically in order to have a context with which to assess
the results of the analysis.
Point Four of the Final Agreement that ended the peace
negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government is
officially titled, “The Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs.”231
As optimistic as that title is, it seems from the terms the two groups
finally agreed to that their aim became more realistic throughout
the process.
In arriving at the Final Agreement, the Mesa de Negociaciones
(Negotiation Table) began the discussions around this goal of
ending the illicit drug industry, back in November 2013.232
Different proposals were at the table, specifically those coming
from two celebrated national forums, one in Bogotá and the other
in San José del Guaviare (a zone notorious for its involvement in
the cocaine trade).233 The two forums took place two months
before the negotiations in Havana with the participation of the civil
Colombian Government and FARC Joint Release, Comunicado Conjunto
No. 34: Acuerdo sobre “Solución al Problema de las Drogas Ilícitas”
[Agreement on the “Solution to the Illicit Drug Problem”] mayo 17, 2014,
available at http://www.humanas.org.co/archivos/comunicadoconjunto34.pdf.
232
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233
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society, among them peasants and cultivators of poppy and of
other base elements for the production of illicit drugs.234 Moreover,
4,000 proposals came from the Mesas Regionales (similar to a
town hall meetings) summoned by the Peace Commissions of the
Senate and the House of Representatives of the Colombian
Congress.235 On May 17, 2014, the government and the FARC
issued Joint Release Number 34, informing the public that they had
reached an agreement on the fourth point of the agenda.236
The result of the discussions culminated in a commitment by
the Colombian government to establish a criminal policy strategy.
This policy has three prongs, all aligned with the aspirations
expressed by both parties in the agreement, that is, to have “a
country without narcotraffic.”237 The first prong identifies the war
against corruption; the second one discusses the investigation,
prosecution, and judgment of crimes carried out by any criminal
organization and related to the production and trade of illicit
drugs.238 Finally, the third prong addresses a strategy against
laundering of assets and assets that in general are involved with
narcotraffic.239
The FARC´s commitment is to contribute in an effective way
to the solution of this problem. The agreement’s careful wording
stated, “within the context of ending the conflict, (the FARC) will
end any relationship with the drug trafficking phenomenon that
had operated as a function of the rebellion.240” From these words,
it seems apparent that the government and the FARC have agreed
that the guerilla group’s involvement in narcotrafficking was
within the frame of rebellion. Thus, it seems to have already been
quietly decided by the government that the FARC’s
234
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available
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narcotrafficking is considered a connected crime to their political
crime of rebellion.
Nonetheless, a clear policy in regard to narcotraffic within the
context of the transition to justice and peace in Colombia remains
to be publicly recognized. Whether narcotraffic can be considered
as a connected political crime cannot be an exclusive matter of
politics but must also be a matter of law. Therefore, in answering
the legal question presented in this article, we apply the various
legal tests to this particular common crime committed by the
FARC–narcotrafficking–to see if it can fall under connected crime
status.
A.
A Determination of FARC´s narcottraficking activities as a
connected crime to rebellion is in Conformity with the Universally
Accepted Tests241
1. Political Incident Test (Anglo-American):
This test supposes that conduct qualified as “politically
connected” is conduct that occurs within the context of a political
incident or an uprising. It should be part of the political incident or
uprising and should be committed with the intent to derive political
consequences.
The political incident in Colombia is the domestic, armed
conflict in which the FARC and the government (among other
actors) were immersed for more than five decades. The FARC got
involved in this conflict with the intent to overthrow the
government, and thus rebellion is the political incident they have
been charged with.
Considering this is such a long incident (spanning several
decades), in order to conclude whether the FARC’s
narcotrafficking could be connected to their crime of rebellion,
their involvement needs to be qualified through the historical
context of the group, as its dynamics changed several times during
the fifty years of armed conflict.

241
The Seventh Phase of FARC´s history is not analyzed in this article due
to the disparity on the sources and lack of possibility to verify the information
found during the research process.
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As explained in Section I, during the five or more decades of
the FARC´s war, its ideology, military strategy, and policies
changed over time. It is widely accepted that during the “rebound
and boom” phase of the 1980s, the FARC´s gramaje was a strategy
within the context of their rebellion used to finance the military
campaign. Thus, at that point, under the political incident test, the
FARC’s ties to narcotrafficking could qualify as a connected
crime.
During the phase of “deterioration and de-legitimization,” the
FARC´s activities in narcotraffic are not as clear. In addition to the
gramaje, which was maintained, the FARC´s activities into the
drug business during this period are known to have progressed.
Throughout this phase the FARC’s military campaign continued to
escalate, this required more resources in personnel, finances, and
infrastructure. These facts support the reports that estimate an
increase in the FARC’s involvement with narcotrafficking in the
1990s. Different organizations have calculated that taxing the coca
growers and the buyers, along with the FARC’s other practices of
kidnapping and extortion, combined could not have been sufficient
to account for their military growth during this phase. Because this
increase in involvement is thought to have been to increase their
military capacity, it can be argued that in its fourth phase, the
FARC’s narcotrafficking activities were still committed to finance
their rebellion, and thus, with the intent to derive political
consequences.
The FARC’s activities during phases five and six, however
seem to point to an abandonment of their military objective.
During the fifth phase of “reorganization and redirection,” the
FARC had already grown enough to sustain forty-eight fronts,
control thirty-seven percent of the country’s small towns,
urbanized the conflict, and escalate the military campaign, all
while fighting a severely weakened government inundated by the
narcotraffic epidemic. Despite the vulnerability of the government
and its own surge in power, the FARC did not advance on its
objective to overthrow the government.
During this period Colombia was a nation plagued by an illegal
drug epidemic that was at its peak. The crime rates were at an alltime high, there was political and social instability with a society
frightened by the level of violence, and a government failing at
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trying to control the problem. In the midst of this, the FARC had
become economically and militarily autonomous. Thus, having all
the circumstances present to achieve the organization´s military
objective of overthrowing the government, the fact that the FARC
did not seriously pursue that goal points to the conclusion that the
group had lost sight of the rebellion. Therefore, under the political
incident test, during the fifth and sixth phases of its development,
from 1993-2002, the FARC’s activity in narcotrafficking would
not be considered a connected crime to the political crime of
rebellion, because their narcotraffic activities were not carried out
to finance the rebellion but rather to grow their business.
In conclusion, by using the incident test to look at the context
and the intent, the FARC’s involvement in narcotrafficking having
evolved from financing a rebellion during the third phase to
turning a profit during the fourth and fifth phase. Therefore, the
fourth phase cannot be qualified as a connected crime, because it
ceased to be part of the incident and was not committed with a
political motive.
2. Political Objective Test (French):
This test supposes that a connected crime involves conduct that
has a political component, and that the means used to carry it out
do not outweigh the seriousness of the crime committed.
Let us remember that the political component is the aim or
motive, the context, or the sought consequences. In the studied
case, the political component depends on the phase in which
FARC activities took place. During the three initial phases, the
motive might have been the defining political component.
However, in the subsequent phases (fourth through sixth), neither
the political motive nor the desired political consequences were
present in the FARC´s narcotraffic activities. Finally, even if one
argues that the political context existed, the seriousness of the
offense outweighs the crime committed.
Although core crimes of international law have primarily been
considered when assessing the seriousness of a crime for
application of the French test, grave violations of human rights are
not limited to these core crimes. The Preamble of the Rome Statute
recognizes that genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and aggression are the most serious crimes. This means that there
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are other crimes that are serious apart from those related to grave
violations of human rights. In the same vein, the UN Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime establishes a broad
definition of serious crimes under Article 2.242 This definition
describes in terms of the amount of penalty, more specifically in
the number of years of deprivation of liberty as a result of the
commission of the crime. The number of years for trafficking,
production, or possession of drugs, established under article 376 of
the Criminal Code of Colombia, exceeds these number of years.
Even though the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime does not explicitly include narcotraffic activities, or any
specific crime, as a serious crime, the travaux preparatoires show
that, during negotiations, the different proposed lists of crimes
considered as serious crimes always include the trafficking in
drugs.
Moreover, this crime is so serious that an analysis of conduct
constituting crimes against humanity committed by FARC might
lead to the conclusion that narcotraffic perpetrated by this group
constitutes the “organizational policy to commit” the attack
directed against the civilian population.243 For instance, an
example of this might be the enforced displacement of the civil
population in order to guarantee the control over the drug routes.
Finally, narcotrafficking is a transnational criminal activity that
goes against the “health and welfare of human beings,” that
“threatens stability, security and sovereignty of States,” that
“penetrate[s] [and] . . . corrupt[s] structures of government” and
society at all its levels,244 as was recognized by Colombia when
signing and ratifying the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Thus,
narcotrafficking could be considered a serious international crime.
242
G.A. Res. 25/55, United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime, 4 (Jan. 8, 2001).
243
I.C.C. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INTERIM REPORT OF THE SITUATION
IN COLOMBIA, (Nov. 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3D3055BD16E2-4C83-BA8535BCFD2A7922/285102/OTPCOLOMBIAPublicInterimReportNovember2012.
pdf.
244
ECOSOC, United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, (Dec. 19, 1998), Preamble,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/49997af90.html.
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Therefore, when applying the proposed approach by the
political objective test, narcotrafficking by the FARC in Colombia
could not be considered as a political connected crime due to the
fact that drug trafficking has a degree of seriousness that, although
not necessarily comparable to the already accepted standards of
barbarity and atrocity, supports the probable conclusion.
While the level of seriousness of narcotrafficking is still under
discussion, factors such as the severe social instability it has
caused in the Colombian society,245 the juridical interests it affects,
and the importance the international community246 has placed on
fighting this crime, all tip the balance in favor of the seriousness of
the crime excluding it from connected crime status. Under this
theory, despite having a political component during the three initial
phases, the seriousness of the crime of narcotrafficking during
every phase of the organization’s history (first through sixth),
outweighs the benefit of connecting it to their political crime.
3. Predominance or proportionality Test (Swiss):
This test supposes that when the political motivation is the
most important aspect of the conduct, which supposes that the
connection between the pure political crime and the common crime
is strong, it can be said that the common crime is strictly necessary
to achieve the political crime. Thus, there is a proportionality of
the common crime to the goal of the pure political crime–an
element that makes this test a restrictive approach on how to
qualify a connected crime.
Generally speaking, the principle of proportionality is used
when assessing a norm that might violate fundamental rights. This
is the reason why courts such as the Inter-American Court on
Human Rights have largely developed this principle. According to
this Court´s case law, the proportionality test is composed by three
prongs: (i) the necessity, requiring that the method used to restrict
a fundamental right was the most benign, or, in general terms, that
the end could not have been reached in a different way that caused
See Sentencia C-069/94, supra note 204 (referencing that The
Constitutional Court of Colombia said that kidnapping is an atrocious crime due
to the social instability caused to the society, among other reasons, and it could
not be considered a political crime.).
246
G.A. Res. 17/8, (Feb. 23, 1990).
245
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less suffering to the individual; (ii) the suitability, requiring that
the means used to make the restriction be the most adequate to the
factual possibilities according to the end that is pursued; and (iii)
the proportionality, requiring the weighing the rights at stake.
Now, in terms of political crimes and the determination of the
connected crimes, the proportionality test has also been used, this
time not necessarily in relation to fundamental rights, but to the
juridical interests protected by denominating conduct as a common
crime or a political crime. The proportionality test, as envisioned
by the Swiss, encompasses three prongs: (i) that the common crime
was committed within the framework of the political objective; (ii)
that the common crime had effectively contributed to achieve the
political objective; and (iii) that the commission of the common
crime was indispensable and necessary to achieve the political
objective.
Regarding the first two prongs, as we will later elucidate, the
argument about narcotrafficking within the framework of the
political objective and its contribution to the achievement of this
political objective, existed during the three first phases of FARC.
Thus, necessity is the prong to be analyzed.
In the context of FARC´s activities related to narcotraffic,
during the initial phases of the organization, the gramaje could be
considered a non-excessive means in the Colombian armed
conflict. However, serving as a gateway between production and
distribution to contribute with the “drugalization” of the society
and the proliferation of violence in Colombia suggest that the
gramaje could actually be considered an excessive means to
finance the crime of rebellion. This is not to say that the gramaje
was not used to finance the rebellion, but it was not necessary
since there were other sources of income that the organization
could have pursued or at least explored during its origins, such as
looking for additional funding from its international and national
supporters.
The other argument is viable as well, in terms that the gramaje
was necessary to finance the military strategy and to expand and
conquer other territories in the country. Nevertheless, we affirm
that the balance inclines towards the lack of necessity of
narcotrafficking activities since the gramaje was not indispensable
to reach their goal. The organization could have pursued its
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funding objective, for example, through the exploitation of natural
resources as many other armed groups have done.247 In that case,
the political component would be more evident, as the link with the
political motive is directly connected with the interest harmed by
the conduct committed, due to the fact that it continues to affect
the State´s juridical interest and still furthers the political objective.
The application of the predominant test to FARC’s drug
activities during the initial phases, when it emerged and started
growing, furthers the assertion that those could not be qualified as
common crimes connected to the political crime of rebellion, since
at least one of the prongs was not met because FARC´s drug
activities were excessive and not indispensable means.
Nevertheless, while looking to FARC’s narcotrafficking
activities the beginning of the 1990´s, during the subsequent
phases of the organization, we can conclude that narcotrafficking
does not meet any of the three prongs of the proportionality test.
FARC’s activities that guide this conclusion are: (1) FARC´s
presence in a great number of municipalities where the coca was
produced, (2) FARC´s control over the price and the merchants
involved in the local trade of coca and cocaine, (3) FARC´s
monopoly of the market in certain areas of Colombia to the point
that they were in a position to trade arms for drugs internally and
internationally.
FARC’s narcotrafficking activities, as described above, go
beyond the framework of the political objective due to the fact that
the predominant motivation was economic profit and not the
overthrowing of the government. The billions of dollars acquired
from the business, even in the most conservative calculation,
exceeds the operational cost of the organization. Additionally, even
though those billions of dollars have contributed to advance their
military tactics, it has not guided the achievement of the political
objective. When the best possible circumstances were present to
achieve the political objective, FARC did not pursue the path to
execute the military strategy and continued pursuing profits and
their market participation in the drug business. Lastly, affecting the
public health of the Colombian society and the world (the juridical
247
See Ursula Daxecker & Brandon C. Prins, Financing rebellion, 54 J.
PEACE RES. 215, 216-18 (Jan. 1, 2017).
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interest protected under the crime of narcotraffic) is not the
ultimate consideration, meaning is not necessary or is an excessive
means, because it could have pursued other, less harmful, means of
financing. For example, they could have pursued the financial
support of the Colombian nationals, as they claim to be the “army
of the people” (FARC-EP). Thus, the application of the Swiss test
to the facts, meaning FARC’s activities during the phases four to
six of the group, persuades the conclusion that narcotrafficking
could not be a connected crime since none of the three prongs are
met.
However, as said before, the lack of clarity regarding FARC´s
relationship with narcotraffic, does not allow a definite conclusion
on whether those activities could be a connected crime to the crime
of rebellion. That is why the discussion about classifying it, a
priori, as a connected crime to FARC´s rebellion should not
prevent this relationship. It is essential to disclose FARC’s extent
of involvement in narcotrafficking during the armed conflict, since
a “permanent and stable peace” can only be achieved with truth,
the foundation and guarantee of reconciliation for any society,
especially in a society like Colombia’s, which has suffered a drug
epidemic.
B.
Determination of FARC´s narcotrafficking activities as a
connected crime to rebellion in Conformity with the Colombian
Case Law
The apparent silent decision to consider narcotrafficking as a
connected crime to rebellion within the context of the peace
negotiations and the Final Agreement is not necessarily consistent
with the case law of the two High Courts of Colombia. In 1963,
the Supreme Court of Justice opted for the “strict relationship test,”
thereby applying the Swiss Test.248 The Constitutional Court did
so as well in 2002 when applying the “reasonable and
proportionality/equality test.”249 As we explained above, the
Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen.
Sentencia, diciembre 13, 1963, M.P: H. Barrera Domínguez, Expediente 1963404438, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.).
249
Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2002,
Sentencia C-695/02, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Expediente D3945) (Colom.).
248
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conclusion when applying this test is that the narcotraffic activities
committed by the FARC could not be considered a connected
crime.
In 1986 and 2007, the Supreme Court of Justice applied the
Anglo-American Test when referring the teleological, paratractic,
and subordinated (hipotáctica) connectivity as a determinative
factor of the qualification––a means to accomplish the end, the
product, or the commission of the political crime.250 When
applying this test to the studied case, narcotraffic can be
considered a connected crime under the third and fourth phases.
However, under the fifth phase (1993-1998) and sixth phase (19982002) there is a lack of connection between FARC´s rebellion and
narcotraffic activities. This allows the inference that according to
the most recent decision analyzed on this matter by the Supreme
Court (2007), the applicable test would lead to excluding the
narcotraffic activities of the FARC as a connected crime, at least
between 1993 to 2002.
Finally, both High Courts of Colombia, when excluding a
specific conduct from qualifying as a connected crime, applied the
French Test in referring to the atrociousness and barbarism of the
conduct. In these decisions, the Courts never excluded narcotraffic
related conduct from the possibility of being considered connected.
The determination on whether narcotrafficking is of sufficient
seriousness to be excluded from ever qualifying as a connected
crime is still under discussion. The fact that neither of the Courts
has expressly excluded this conduct as a connected crime does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that narcotrafficking is not
serious enough to be excluded from the connected crime category.
In this analysis we have argued that narcotrafficking is serious
enough and that this assertion seems to be backed by the
international community.

Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen.
Sentencia, May 6, 1987, M.P: J. Carreño Luengas, Expediente 1986-406567,
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme
Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. Sentencia, Dec. 5, 2007, M.P: M. del Rosario González,
Expediente 2007-415134, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.).
250
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V.
CONCLUSION
The peace talks in Havana designed to bring about a stable and
lasting peace in Colombia seem to have culminated in the
Colombian government and the FARC quietly agreeing to consider
the FARC’s narcotrafficking activities over the decades as a
connected crime to their political crime of rebellion. As laid out in
this article, the context of the peace negotiations, the peace
agreement, and Transitory Article 67 of the Constitution support
the theory that the Colombian government has agreed to connect
the crime. Therefore, an agreement on this connection between the
government and the FARC that circumvents the court system could
lead to undesirable consequences both nationally and
internationally.
On the international level, Colombia could be ignoring an
international obligation derived from the UN Convention Against
Illicit Traffic of 1988. According to Article 3.10,
[f]or the purpose of co-operation among the Parties
under this Convention . . . . offences established in
accordance with this article251 shall not be
ECOSOC, United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs
and
Psychotropic
Substances,
(Dec.
19,
1998),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/49997af90.html. Article 3.1(a) establishes as
criminal offences:
i). The production, manufacture, extraction; preparation, offering, offering
for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage,
dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation or exportation of any narcotic
drug or any psychotropic substance contrary to the provisions of the 1961
Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention;
ii) The cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant for the
purpose of the production of narcotic drugs contrary to the provisions of the
1961Convention and the 1961 Convention as amended;
iii) The possession or purchase of any narcotic drug or psychotropic
substance for the purpose of any of the activities enumerated in i) above;
iv) The manufacture, transport or distribution of equipment, materials or of
substances listed in Table I and Table II, knowing that they are to be used in or
for the illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or
psychotropic substances;
v) The organization, management or financing of any of the offences
enumerated in i), ii), iii) or iv) above.
Article 3.1 (b) and (c), also considered as criminal offences, the following
conducts:
251
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considered as . . . political offences or regarded as
politically motivated, without prejudice to the
constitutional limitations and the fundamental
domestic law of the Parties.252
This is a safeguard clause that could open the door for
Colombia to qualify the FARC’s narcotrafficking activities as
connected political crimes and to derive consequences like nonextraditions, amnesties and pardons. In principle, the Colombian
Constitutional system operates within that safeguard clause. Even
though the Colombian Constitution does not specifically mention
any of the conduct related to narcotraffic as a connected political
crime, the constitutional transitory disposition, Article 67,
recognizes the concept of connected crimes and dictates that a
i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is
derived from any offence or offences established in accordance with
subparagraph a) of this paragraph, or from an act of participation in such offence
or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the
property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such
an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his actions;
ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location,
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property,
knowing that such property is derived from an offence or offences established in
accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph or from an act of
participation in such an offence or offences;
c) Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal
system:
i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of
receipt, that such property was derived from an offence or offences established
in accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph or from an act of
participation in such offence or offences;
ii) The possession of equipment or materials or substances listed in Table I
and
Table II, knowing that they are being or are to be used in or for the illicit
cultivation, production or
iii) Publicly inciting or inducing others, by any means, to commit any of the
offences established in accordance with this article or to use narcotic drugs or
psychotropic substances illicitly;
iv) Participation in, association or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit
and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the
offences established in accordance with this article.
252
Id.
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statutory law will regulate these types of crimes.253 In this context,
the Constitutional Court of Colombia, as explained in section II of
this article, stated that the legal benefits applicable to the main
crime (e.g. rebellion) are extended to the connected crime (e.g.
narcotraffic). Thus, the constitutional benefits granted to the
political crimes in Art. 150.17 of the Colombian Constitution
(amnesty and pardon), and in Art. 35 paragraph 3, (exception for
extradition), are extended to the connected crimes.
Therefore, the Colombian Constitution allows for any aspect of
narcotrafficking to be considered a connected crime to the political
crime (provided that the factual connection was established)
creating a permissible exercise under Art. 3.10 of the UN
Convention Against Illicit Traffic.
However, the safeguard clause of Art. 3.10 of the Convention,
is not to be read and applied as an open door to include any crime
within the category of “political motivated” crimes. This article has
a strict interpretation as reflected in the negotiations254 and in the
commentary of the Convention. When referring to the Article 3.10
prohibition to consider certain conducts related to narcotraffic as
politically motivated crimes, the commentary on the Convention
states that “this provision is intended to restrict the possibility of an
individual invoking the protection of the so-called political offence
exception” in circumstances such as terrorism and “other like
circumstances.” 255 That assertion in the Commentary is based on
General Assembly Resolution S-17/2, where the States expressed a
concern of the “growing link between illicit traffic and terrorist
activities.”256
Therefore, categorizing conduct by the FARC prescribed in
Article 3.1 (a) and (b) during phases four through six as
“politically connected” to FARC’s rebellion “would be an obstacle
to the provision of the measures of international cooperation
provided for in articles 5 [Confiscation], 6 [Extradition], 7 [Mutual
See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 201.
For example, see Richard Vogler & Shahrzad Fouladvand, UN core
Conventions on Transnational Organised Crime, in:INT’L L. & TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANISED CRIME 117-19 (2016).
255
ECOSOC, Commentary on the United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, at 98 (Dec. 19, 1998).
256
Id.
253
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legal assistance] and 9 [other forms of co-operation and
training],”257 something that the article was precisely designed to
avoid. Specially, if read in conjunction with Article 24 which only
allows for flexibility in the sense that the State Parties could take
more severe or stricter measures that those mandated in the
Convention, it does not allow for flexibility to ameliorate the grave
nature of the offences in Article 3.1 (a) and (b).
Reading and applying Articles 3.10 and 24 together shows that
the drafters of the Convention, including Colombia after
ratification, agreed that there is a link between illicit trafficking
and politically motivated crimes,258 but they also acknowledged
that “an act carried out in a political context (such as an armed
uprising) may not be regarded as political if done for a private or
personal reason.”259 This does not mean that the safeguard clause
contained in Article 3.10 does not have any effect, but that it has a
limitation in the scope of application when the connection of the
conduct is non-existent and therefore cannot be categorized as a
connected crime.
In these terms, Colombia may be breaching an international
obligation. The general principle of international law of pacta sunt
servanda bona fides requires not only compliance with the
international obligation but also good faith.260 Qualifying FARC´s
narcotrafficking activities as a connected crime, without
considering the real extent of the group’s involvement in every
phase and the real degree of connection according to the test that
the State decides to apply, put Colombia in breach of this
international principle articulated in Article 3.10 of the Convention
Against Illicit Traffic.
On a national level, the consequences for qualifying
narcotraffic as a connected crime goes directly to the terms,
obligations, and aspirations of the Peace Agreement. The analysis
presented in this article is based on the reality of what Colombia
has undergone during the armed conflict and is still undergoing as
part of the Peace Process between the government and the FARC.
Id. at 96.
See generally id.
259
Id. at 96.
260
ANTHONY AUST, PACTA SUNT SERVANDA (Oxford Public International
Law 2007).
257
258
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Colombia signed a Peace Agreement to transition to a “stable and
permanent peace” in 2016. In order to achieve the desirable peace,
a system needs to be put into practice. This system is universally
known as the Transitional Justice System (TJS).
Every TJS is different and there is not a unique formula to
implement it. However, the tools commonly used are designed for,
and envision, the desired peace. Thus, regardless of the form and
mechanism used by the society undergoing a transition to peace,
the ideas of adequate accountability, reparations to the victims, and
reconciliation between perpetrators and victims are always an
important element to achieve peace.
The government of Colombia and the FARC during the
negotiations selected the tools to be implemented as this TJS. The
Colombian Peace Agreement explicitly creates, “the integral
system of truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition,” a system
that would be composed of several mechanisms and measures like
the Truth Commission, the Special Unit for Enforced
Disappearances, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, the Measures of
Integral Reparations, and Guarantees of Non-Repetition.261 Despite
this selection of mechanisms and tools, Colombia still needs to
form them, create them, and give them a legal and institutional
framework to operate and achieve the desired “permanent and
stable peace” agreed on by the government and the FARC.
As said before, Colombia has already decided that the TJS
would seek the disclosure of truth of the events that took place
between the armed actors and against the civilians during the more
than five decades of armed activities. Further, it would seek to
achieve the peaceful coexistence between Colombians, and it
would seek guarantees of non-repetition. Thus, narrowing every
tool could only attain the goals sought and envisioned.
In light of narcotraffic as an important element of Colombian
history and a major problem of the Colombian society, one that
surpassed the common criminality and contaminated groups like
the FARC, narcotraffic crime cannot be ignored in the
implementation of the truth mechanisms, special jurisdiction
261

Final Accord for the End of Conflict and the Construcion of a Stable and
Lasting
Peace
8
(Nov.
24,
2016),
available
at
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/
Documentos%20compartidos/24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf.
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mechanisms, the reparation mechanism, and the mechanism for
guarantees of non-repetition. Particular to this assertion, the
Government and the FARC included the issue of illicit drugs with
the intention to find a “Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs” as
part of the issues to negotiate at the table in Havana, demonstrating
that both parties recognized the role of narcotrafficking in the noninternational armed conflict in Colombia, implicitly FARC’s
involvement, to a certain extent, with the crime of illicit trafficking
or narcotrafficking.
Despite the title “Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs” and
the intention to address “coca eradication and crop substitution,
public health and drug consumption, and the solution to the
phenomenon of drug production and trafficking”, neither the
agenda nor the peace agreement expressly mentions the disclosure
of the FARC’s involvement in narcotrafficking or the
accountability of their narcotrafficking activities.
Even if we agree that defining criminal conduct in a
transitional justice system is a dilemma between law and
politics,262 in the context of Colombia we cannot ignore the
commission of this crime. As we argued primarily on this article,
the decision to qualify FARC’s illicit drug trafficking, as a political
connected crime to the crime of rebellion, requires a complete
picture of the facts, and it could not be considered a politically
connected crime in some phases of the organization’s history.
Thus, the opportunity opened by the Amnesty Law, to approach
this by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, should be taken seriously
and should not be influenced by the terms used in the Final
Agreement and the Amnesty Law which could compel the
conclusion that the FARC´s narcotrafficking activities were
committed entirely for the purposes of financing its rebellion.
In conclusion, looking at the parties’ intentions at the
negotiation table, the purpose of the peace agreement, and the
values underlying the Transitional Justice System selected by
Colombia, narcotrafficking has to be part of the process, and
discussed openly with appropriate criminal accountability for the
FARC’s activities. This is required if non-repetition is to be
262
Kai Ambos, The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice: A Systematic
Study with Special Focus on the Role of the ICC, in BUILDING A FUTURE ON
PEACE AND JUSTICE, 19, 23 (Springer et al. 2009).
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guaranteed, if a real reconciliation in the Colombian society is
desired, and if a real, stable, and permanent peace is to be
achieved.

